1

Nash Welfare Guarantees for Fair and Efficient Coverage
We study coverage problems in which, for a set of agents and a given threshold $T$, the goal is to select $T$ subsets (of the agents) …
Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Yadati Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukan
PDF Cite
Achieving Envy-Freeness with Limited Subsidies under Dichotomous Valuations
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents in a fair manner. While envy-free allocations of indivisible goods …
Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Yadati Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukan
PDF Cite Video
Tight Approximation Algorithms for p-Mean Welfare Under Subadditive Valuations
We develop polynomial-time algorithms for the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods among $n$ agents that have subadditive …
Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Anand Krishna, Ranjani G. Sundaram
PDF Cite Slides Video
An example conference paper
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Duis posuere tellus ac convallis placerat. Proin tincidunt magna sed ex sollicitudin condimentum.
Anand Krishna, Robert Ford
PDF Cite Project Slides
An example conference paper